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Issues in the Third Circuit
FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY v. CHESTER COUNTY AND THE TEN
COMMANDMENTS DEBATE: THE BUCK STOPS HERE FOR
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS
PUBLIC DISPLAYS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of separation of church and state is familiar to Ameri-
cans; most would consider it fundamental to our character as a democratic
nation.' This concept, however, is not as well defined in jurisprudential
doctrine as the fundamental notions of free speech, free press or equal
protection under the laws.2 Judicial interpretations of the Establishment
Clause have created an ambiguous line of reasoning and an apparent disa-
vowal of any one specific test to determine Establishment Clause viola-
tions.3 Among the factual situations governed by the Establishment
Clause are religious public displays and government aid to parochial
schools.
4
The Supreme Court appears to prefer a case-by-case approach to de-
ciding Establishment Clause challenges to religious public displays, such as
the Ten Commandments, focusing on history and context as understood
by a reasonable observer. 5 Such a fact-specific nature of the Court's analy-
sis inevitably leads to inconsistent holdings in the courts. 6 Although in-
consistent jurisprudence normally increases the likelihood of Supreme
1. See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Politics, Religion, and the First Amendment, 50
DEPAUL L. REv. 111, 112 (2000) (referring to "the long-respected principle of sepa-
ration of church and state").
2. See, e.g., JULIA K. STRONKS, LAW, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A COMMEN-
TARY ON FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 10 (2002) (noting "[i]t is undisputed
that our courts are inconsistent in their treatment of religion"); Martha McCarthy,
Preserving the Establishment Clause: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back, 2001 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 271, 271 (2001) (noting that Court's rationales in certain Establish-
ment Clause cases "are somewhat difficult to reconcile"); Ashley M. Bell, Com-
ment, "God Save this Honorable Court": How Curent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L.
REv. 1273, 1274 (2001) (describing lack of consistency and discrepancies in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence).
3. For a discussion of the Court's apparent disavowal of any specific test, see
infra notes 24-82 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (addressing religious
public display); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971) (addressing state aid
to parochial schools). The separate factual situation of state aid to parochial
schools is beyond the scope of this Casebrief.
5. For a discussion of the endorsement test and the reasonable observer stan-
dard, see infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the Court's infrequent grant of certiorari in religious
(907)
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Court review, the context-specific nature of these challenges is compatible
with the Supreme Court's case-by-case standard. 7 The Court has not
granted certiorari to a Ten Commandments public display case in over
twenty years.8 Thus, in the Third Circuit, the buck stops with Freethought
Society v. Chester County,9 the 2003 debate-provoking pronouncement of
what constitutes acceptable public displays of a religious nature.10
This Casebrief identifies the Third Circuit's preferred analysis of pub-
lic displays challenged under the Establishment Clause and serves as a
guide to practitioners bringing or defending against these challenges in
the Third Circuit." Part II reviews the Supreme Court's decisions that
establish the current interpretations of Establishment Clause doctrine.
12
Part III analyzes Freethought Society, setting forth the Third Circuit's meth-
odology and reasoning in upholding a Ten Commandments display
against an Establishment Clause challenge. 13 Part V supports the predic-
tion that the Supreme Court will reluctantly grant certiorari to religious
public display cases; furthermore, the Court is unlikely to create a new test
public display cases and the various circuit court decisions on the issue, see infra
notes 134-53 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's promotion of a case-by-case analy-
sis that is necessarily context-specific, see infra notes 56-60, 71-72 and accompany-
ing text.
8. See, e.g., Gail Gibson, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 13, 2004, at 1A (describing
twenty-year span since Court decided case involving Ten Commandments display).
See generally Joel L. Thollander, Note, Thou Shalt Not Challenge the Court? The Ten
Commandments Defense Act as a Lgislative Invitation for Judicial Reconsideration, 4
N.Y.U. J. LEcIS. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 227 (2001) (advocating that Supreme Court
should reconsider Ten Commandments displays). Thollander analyzes the Ten
Commandments Defense Act (TCDA), an amendment to the Juvenile Justice Re-
form Act, proposed by the United States House of Representatives. See id. at
205-06 (identifying TCDA as subject of article). The House proposed the TCDA
in response to the Columbine High School shootings, and advocated posting the
Ten Commandments in public schools to curb school violence. See id. (explaining
purpose of TCDA). Opponents of the measure cited Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
41 (1980) (holding statute unconstitutional that required posting Ten Command-
ments in public schools), as evidence of the TCDA's unconstitutionality. See id. at
206 (noting opponents' arguments). Thus, Thollander argues that the TCDA in-
vites the Supreme Court to reconsider its holding in Stone and possibly reaffirm
that reasoning. See id. (noting author's arguments). As of the date of this article,
the TCDA had not been passed. SeeJuvenile Justice Reform Act, H.R. 1501, 106th
Cong. (1999) (stating provisions of Act).
9. 334 F.3d 247, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (allowing display of Ten Commandments
on Chester County courthouse because of Ten Commandments' historical context
and secular meaning in American legal tradition).
10. For further discussion of this author's prediction the circuit courts will be
the final arbiters of most religious public display cases, see infra notes 134-45 and
accompanying text.
11. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's opinion in Freethought Society, see
infra notes 99-120 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, see infra notes 24-82 and accompanying text.
13. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's reasoning to uphold the religious
display in Freethought Society, see infra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
908 [Vol. 49: p. 907
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for these cases. 14 That section demonstrates the importance of the Third
Circuit's opinion in Freethought Society in light of the recent "Hang-Ten"
movement, among others, which advocates public displays of the Ten
Commandments in response to recent rashes of school violence and ter-
rorism.15 Part V concludes with suggestions for practitioners in the Third
Circuit, identifying the necessary elements of an Establishment Clause
challenge or defense and recommending approaches for effective litiga-
tion of this issue.1 6
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Historical Roots of the Establishment Clause
Religion and politics have had an interesting interplay throughout
American history. 17 Since Thomas Jefferson first posited that there
should be a "wall of separation" between established religion and govern-
ment,1 8 there has remained a common understanding that religion has a
role in political development. 19 The familiar words "In God We Trust,"
along with other forms of ceremonial deism,20 are reminders of an ac-
14. For support of this author's prediction, see infra notes 123-27, 134-44
and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the "Hang-Ten" movement, see infra notes 128-32 and
accompanying text.
16. For suggestions to Third Circuit practitioners, see infra notes 155-66 and
accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Gregg Ivers, Organized Religion and the Supreme Court, in CON-
SCIENCE AND BELIEF: THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 77 (Kermit L. Hall ed.,
2000) [hereinafter CONSCIENCE AND BELIEF] (noting that "organized religion has a
long and rich tradition of political engagement in the United States"); RICHARD E.
MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 4 (1972) (declaring that early Ameri-
can history is "crucial" to understanding Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
18. See, e.g., David Little, Thomas Jefferson's Religious Views and Their Influence on
the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, in CONSCIENCE AND BELIEF,
supra note 17, at 270-71 (citing famous letter written by Jefferson containing "wall
of separation" language). Jefferson phrased what has become a tenet of American
democracy: "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole Ameri-
can people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a
wall of separation between Church and State." Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), re-
printed in A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 332-33 (1944)).
19. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (noting that "[t]he
concept of a 'wall' of separation is a useful figure of speech... [b]ut the metaphor
itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship
that in fact exists between church and state"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
614 (1971) (acknowledging that separation doctrine is not absolute).
20. See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial De-
ism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2094-96 (1996) (defining ceremonial deism). The
author divides ceremonial deism into two categories, "core" and "fringe." See id. at
2095 (naming categories). "Core" ceremonial deism includes practices that are
deemed noncontroversial as a result of little or no litigation challenging these
practices and no court ever having declared these practices unconstitutional. See
CASEBR1EF20041 909
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cepted and lengthy affair between religion and government.2 1 Because
the language of the Establishment Clause-"Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion" 22-does not provide concrete
guidelines for courts to follow, it is important to note how the Supreme
Court has interpreted and applied the clause to constitutional challenges
of religious displays.
23
B. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: Is There a Test?
The legislative history of the Establishment Clause is rather sparse,
offering no definitive statement of the Establishment Clause's meaning or
of the restrictions it imposes on government. 24 Courts, therefore, are
forced to interpret the Establishment Clause without a clear statement
from the legislature. that passed the amendment.25 The 1947 case Everson
id. (describing concept of "core" ceremonial deism). Examples include: (1) recit-
ing "God save the United States and this Honorable Court" to begin judicial pro-
ceedings; and (2) use of the Bible to administer oaths. See id. (listing examples).
"Fringe" ceremonial deism includes those practices that have given rise to consid-
erable litigation and findings of unconstitutionality. See id. (defining concept of
"fringe" ceremonial deism). Examples include: (1) government displays of nativity
scenes; and (2) religious displays on government property. See id. at 2095-96 (list-
ing examples). Epstein posits that "[t ]he implications of ceremonial deism are far-
reaching because courts frequently employ this amorphous concept as a spring-
board from which to hold that other challenged practices do not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause." Id. at 2086.
21. See, e.g., KENNETH R. CRAVcRAFr JR., THE AMERICAN MYrH OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 3 (1999) (describing religious freedom case law as mythical).
[T]he adjudication of Supreme Court cases involving religion is often an
exercise in trying to balance two competing myths-America as a "Chris-
tian" nation versus America as a "secular" nation-while remaining con-
stitutionally committed to a third, dominant myth: the theory of religious
freedom at the heart of our public life.
Id.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating Establishment Clause).
23. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (describing language of Establishment
Clause as "opaque" and lacking specific instruction as to what is constitutionally
prohibited by clause). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation and
application of the Establishment Clause, see infra notes 31-82 and accompanying
text.
24. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEvy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 99 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that legislative debate on Establish-
ment Clause was uneventful). The following description demonstrates the useless-
ness of the House debates in clarifying the meaning and scope of the
Establishment Clause:
The debate as unreliably reported was sometimes irrelevant, usually apa-
thetic and unclear. Ambiguity, brevity, and imprecision in thought and
expression characterize the comments of the few members who spoke.
That the House understood the debate, cared deeply about its outcome,
or shared a common understanding of the finished amendment seems
doubtful. Only a few members participated.
Id.
25. See id. at 99-100 (noting absence of guidance from Framers as to Estab-
lishment Clause's meaning).
[Vol. 49: p. 907
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v. Board of Education"26 is the beginning of modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence because it attempted to define the scope of the clause. 2 7
Since Everson, the Court has created a scattered judicial doctrine on the
subject.28 A brief overview of the Court's opinions will reveal the compet-
ing tests and the current prevailing test for religious display cases that the
Third Circuit used to uphold the Ten Commandments display in
Freethought Society.29
1. The First Test: Lemon v. Kurtzman
30
The Court created the first test for deciding Establishment Clause vio-
lations in the 1971 case Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 1 Citizens challenged two
states' statutes providing state funding to religious elementary and secon-
dary schools.32 The Court identified a three-part test aimed at correcting
26. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (upholding New Jersey statute under which state
paid bus fare of students attending religious schools).
27. See id. at 15-16 (giving basic meaning of Establishment Clause). The Ever-
son majority described the basic scope of the clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per-
son to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice relig-
ion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa.
Id.
28. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (announcing endorsement test for Establishment Clause challenges
to religious public displays); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (failing
to apply any particular test to uphold Nebraska statute allowing public funds to pay
for chaplain's services in local legislature); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971) (announcing three-part test for Establishment Clause violations).
Each of these cases represents a separate approach to the Establishment Clause.
Compare Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (applying endorsement test), with Marsh, 463
U.S. at 795 (lacking test), and Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (creating three-part test).
Marsh is considered an anomaly because the Court relied on the historical signifi-
cance of legislative chaplains to reach its result, as opposed to the Lemon test that
was popularly used at that time. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 2, at 1294-95 (explaining
that Marsh departed from Court's consistent application of Lemon in 1980s because
Marsh focused on history).
29. For a discussion of the Court's Establishment Clause opinions relevant to
public display cases, see infra notes 38-43, 49-82 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the test the Third Circuit used in Freethought Society, see infra notes
99-102, 106-20 and accompanying text.
30. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
31. See id. at 607 (holding two states' statutes unconstitutional).
32. See id. at 607-11 (describing Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes at
issue). Rhode Island's statute authorized the state to subsidize the salaries of non-
5
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"the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended
to afford protection." 3- The three evils are government sponsorship, fi-
nancial support and active involvement in religious activity.3 4 Hence the
three-part Lemon test: (1) the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; (2) the primary effect of the statute may neither advance nor inhibit
religion; and (3) the statute may not promote "excessive government en-
tanglement with religion."3 5 Applying this test, the Court held that both
of the challenged statutes violated the Establishment Clause.3 6 The Court
would stress in later opinions, however, that there is no stringent test ap-
plicable to all Establishment Clause cases. 3
7
The Court first ruled on a public display of the Ten Commandments
in the 1980 case Stone v. Graham.38 The Kentucky legislature passed a law
that required posting the Ten Commandments in every public school
classroom.3 9 Applying the Lemon test, the Court held the law unconstitu-
tional. 40 Because the statute in question had to survive all three prongs of
the test to pass constitutional muster, the Court needed no further analysis
once the Kentucky statute failed the first prong of the Lemon test.4 1 Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Stone questioned the majority opinion's importance
because it was a per curiam opinion, issued without argument before the
Court.42 Stone, however, remains the Court's only word on the particular
issue of Ten Commandments displays. 43
public school teachers. See id. at 607 (explaining statute). Pennsylvania's statute
authorized the superintendent to make contracts with nonpublic schools to
purchase their services; these contracts were essentially reimbursements for non-
public school expenditures. See id. at 609-10 (outlining statute).
33. Id. at 612.
34. See id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (allowing
government tax breaks for religious institutions)) (listing three evils).
35. See id. at 612-13 (outlining three-part test that can be gleaned from
Court's prior cases). The formulation of this test was the Court's first identifica-
tion of a theme from its earlier Establishment Clause cases. See id. at 612 (noting
that "cumulative criteria" have been "developed by the Court over many years").
36. See id. at 607 (finding statutes unconstitutional).
37. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984) (declaring there
is no rigid test to be applied in Establishment Clause cases).
38. 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam) (applying Lemon test to hold Ken-
tucky statute unconstitutional).
39. See id. at 39-40 (recounting statute that required posting of Ten
Commandments).
40. See id. at 40-41 (declaring Kentucky statute unconstitutional).
41. See id. (noting that statute is unconstitutional if it violates any of Lemon's
three prongs).
42. See id. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing opinion as "a cavalier
summary reversal, without benefit of oral argument or briefs on the merits").
43. For further discussion of the view that Stone is the only guidance available
from the Supreme Court for Ten Commandments displays thus far, see infra note
144 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 49: p. 907
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The Lemon facts are a common scenario within which Establishment
Clause challenges arise: state aid to religious schools.44 Stone represents
another situation in which the Establishment Clause is implicated: public
displays of religious symbols such as the Ten Commandments or a nativity
scene. -4 5 This religious display category was the central issue before the
Third Circuit in Freethought Society, and is also the center of an intense na-
tional debate about Ten Commandments displays specifically.46 Despite
the categorical distinction in the types of cases in which religious constitu-
tional issues arise, the Lemon test was considered the prevailing analysis for
Establishment Clause cases until the Court tailored the inquiry for relig-
ious display challenges.
47
2. Refining the Inquiry: The Endorsement Test of Lynch v. Donnelly48
a. The Majority Opinion
Although the Court has not expressly overruled Lemon, the Court
adapted the Lemon test to better accommodate religious display chal-
lenges.49 In the 1984 case Lynch v. Donnelly, residents challenged a town's
annual Christmas display that contained a creche (a religious scene depict-
ing Christ's birth). 50 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion acknowl-
44. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) (identifying chal-
lenged action as involving state aid to nonpublic schools). See generally McCarthy,
supra note 2, at 272-81 (discussing Establishment Clause cases involving schools).
45. See, e.g., Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989) (challenging consti-
tutionality of two displays on government property that included nativity scene and
menorah); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (challenging Christmas
display containing creche); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39 (1980) (challenging
state statute mandating Ten Commandments displays in public school class-
rooms). See generally Tarik Abdel-Monem, Note, Posting the Ten Commandments as a
Historical Document in Public Schools, 87 IowA L. Riv. 1023 (2002) (describing
"Hang-Ten" movement to post Ten Commandments in public schools and build-
ings and noting possibility of litigation from movement).
46. See Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 249-50 (3d Cir.
2003) (noting subject of challenge is Ten Commandments display). For a discus-
sion of the "Hang-Ten" debate, see infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Stone, 449 U.S. at 43 n.5 (distinguishing Lemon facts from display
of Ten Commandments). The footnote, written in response to the dissent, states:
The Supreme Court cases cited by the dissenting opinion as contrary [to
the Court's holding] ... are easily distinguishable: all are cases involving
state assistance to private schools. Such assistance has the obvious legiti-
mate secular purpose of promoting educational opportunity. The post-
ing of the Ten Commandments on classroom walls has no such secular
purpose.
Id. (citations omitted).
48. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (setting forth
endorsement test).
49. For an explanation of the endorsement test as a clarification of the pur-
pose and effect prongs of the Lemon test, see infra notes 62-69 and accompanying
text.
50. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 (describing creche and noting claimants were
Pawtucket, Rhode Island residents and members of local chapter of ACLU).
7
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edged the "role of religion in American life from at least 1789"5 1 and
noted the government's continued recognition and subsidization of relig-
ious holidays. 52 The majority opinion also described other references to
"our religious heritage '5 3 and various instances of ceremonial deism. 54
Highlighting these permissible acknowledgements of religion allowed the
majority to focus on the history and context of the city's purportedly relig-
ious display, and ultimately led the Court to uphold that display.
5 5
The justices disavowed any rigid formula with which to decide the
case. 56 The majority announced a case-by-case approach that called for
"line-drawing [because] no fixed, perse rule can be framed. '5 7 Although it
mentioned the Lemon factors as important to any analysis, the Court stated
its "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensi-
tive area."58 The Court found that the display had a secular purpose after
examining the creche within the context of the Christmas display as a
whole, and the Court noted that no one had complained about the
creche's inclusion in the display for over forty years.59 Consequently, the
Court upheld the display against an Establishment Clause challenge. 60 Al-
though the majority made clear that it was not constrained to follow a
rigid test, the Court did not explicitly define the scope of its analysis.
6 1
b. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion clarified the majority's ap-
proach and established the endorsement test that the Third Circuit later
used to uphold the display in Freethought Society.62 Justice O'Connor identi-
51. Id. at 674 (noting role of religion in American history).
52. See id. at 676 ("Thus it is clear that the Government has long recognized-
indeed it has subsidized-holidays with religious significance.").
53. Id. at 676.
54. See id. at 676-77 (noting that religiously inspired paintings hang in Na-
tional Gallery in Washington, D.C. and scene of Moses with Ten Commandments
hangs in Supreme Court's Chambers). For further discussion of ceremonial de-
ism, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (declaring that Court's inquiry must focus on
"the creche in the context of the Christmas season").
56. See id. at 678 ("This history may help explain why the Court consistently
has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause.").
57. Id. (advocating case-by-case approach).
58. Id. at 679 (refusing to follow rigid formula).
59. See id. at 684-85 (noting display has secular purpose and creche has been
included in display for over forty years); id. at 680 (identifying secular purposes of
display as celebrating national holiday and depicting origins of holiday).
60. See id. at 687 (finding display constitutional).
61. For a discussion of the Lynch Court's refusal to follow any strict test, see
supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
62. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (focusing on gov-
ernment endorsement of religion). Although there are fourjustices in the court's
opinion and four dissenting justices, there is still a majority opinion (as opposed to
a plurality) because Justice O'Connor specifically joined the majority. She wrote
only to clarify the endorsement test. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's em-
914 [Vol. 49: p. 907
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss5/2
2004] CASEBRIEF 915
fled two instances in which the government violates the Establishment
Clause: (1) excessive government entanglement with religious institutions,
and (2) government endorsement or disapproval of religion. 63 She de-
scribed government endorsement of religion as the "more direct infringe-
ment" on the First Amendment guarantee.6 4 Justice O'Connor attempted
to elucidate the Lemon analysis and the Court's religion clause doctrine in
general.
65
The endorsement test asks: (1) what the government intended to con-
vey by the challenged display; and (2) what message the challenged dis-
play actually conveyed. 66 Justice O'Connor related these two inquiries of
the endorsement test to the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon analy-
sis. 67 The purpose prong, which requires that the government activity
have a secular purpose, asks "whether the government intends to convey a
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion." 68 The effect prong
asks whether the government, in reality or according to public perception
and regardless of intention, communicates "a message of government en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion.' 6 9 In agreement with the majority,
Justice O'Connor found that the city's display did not violate the endorse-
ment test.
70
Like the majority of the Lynch Court, Justice O'Connor focused on
the display's history and context as part of the case-by-case approach to
these Establishment Clause challenges. 71 She stressed that "[e]very gov-
ployment of the endorsement test for the religious display in Freethought Society, see
infra notes 99-102, 106-16 and accompanying text.
63. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing "two
principal ways" that "[g]overnment can run afoul" of Establishment Clause).
64. See id. at 688 (O'Connor,J, concurring) (finding endorsement of religion
to be more obviously violative of Establishment Clause than excessive entangle-
ment). Government endorsement legitimizes religion and sends the message that
followers of the endorsed religion are favored members of the civic community;
those who do not adhere to the endorsed beliefs are outsiders. See id. (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (offering consequences of government endorsement of religion).
65. See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (declaring that she was writing
"to suggest a clarification of [the Court's] Establishment Clause doctrine").
66. See id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that to decide whether
city's display endorsed religion included examining city's intended message and
what message was actually conveyed; test is both subjective and objective).
67. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "purpose and effect prongs
of the Lemon test represent these two aspects of the meaning of the city's action").
68. See id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining purpose prong of
Lemon).
69. See id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining effect prong of
Lemon).
70. See id. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that city's display con-
taining creche did not endorse religion); id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(finding that city did not include creche in larger display to highlight its religious
significance).
71. See id. at 676 (noting long history of government subsidization of religious
holidays); id. at 679 (focusing inquiry on display in context of Christmas season);
id. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting creche was traditional and gov-
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ernment practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to deter-
mine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion."
72
Thus, both the majority and Justice O'Connor agreed on a case-by-case
analysis with a focus on history and context, which the Third Circuit ulti-
mately employed in Freethought Society.
73
c. Clarifying and Reaffirming the Endorsement Test
Following the Lynch decision, the Court continued to reference the
endorsement test and solidified its position as the preferred analysis in
public display cases.7 4 In Allegheny v. ACLU,7 5 the Court analyzed two holi-
day displays in Pittsburgh: a creche in the grand staircase of the court-
house and a menorah at the entrance to a city government building.
7 6
After citing the Lemon test, the majority noted that "subsequent decisions
further have refined" the inquiry by focusing on whether the governmen-
tal display endorses religion. 7 7 The Allegheny majority observed, "the
[Lynch] concurrence provides a sound analytical framework for evaluating
governmental use of religious symbols."7 8 Focusing on each display's over-
all context, the Court held that the creche had the unconstitutional effect
of endorsing religion, but the menorah did not because of its placement
next to a Christmas tree and the display's overall theme of liberty.
7 9
Justice O'Connor also concurred in Allegheny, but wrote specially to
clarify her concurrence in Lynch as the official test for analyzing Establish-
ment Clause challenges. 80 In reiterating the importance of history and
ernment had long supported Christmas holiday, but also noting endorsement test
was "not a question of simple historical fact").
72. Id. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing case-by-case approach).
73. For a discussion of the Lynch Court's support for the case-by-case ap-
proach, see supra notes 56-61, 71-72 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the Third Circuit's use of history and context in Freethought Society, see infra notes
99-116 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (declaring that
"since Lynch, the Court has made clear" that endorsement test is preferred).
75. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
76. See id. at 578-79 (examining two holiday displays in Pittsburgh under Es-
tablishment Clause; finding one display permissible and one impermissible).
77. See id. at 592 (stating "[iln recent years, we have paid particularly close
attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose
or effect of 'endorsing' religion").
78. See id. at 595 (supporting idea that endorsement test currently is preferred
analysis in religious display cases). Justice Blackmun's majority opinion cited Lynch
for the "essential principle" of the Establishment Clause. See id. (citing Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) (declaring that focus of inquiry is whether
government appears to make religion relevant to one's political position).
79. See id. at 579-88 (offering detailed description of location and overall dis-
play, in addition to historical and religious meanings of creche and menorah); id.
at 621 (offering holding of case).
80. See id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "no alternative test
has been suggested that captures the essential mandate of the Establishment
Clause as well as the endorsement test does, and it warrants continued application
and refinement").
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context, Justice O'Connor explained that the reasonable observer stan-
dard is used to evaluate the display.8 1 The reasonable observer standard is
the perspective of one informed of the history and context within which
the government displays the religious symbol, and one who can distin-
guish a secular purpose from a purely religious one.8 2 The Third Circuit
followed this methodology in Freethought Society, invoking the reasonable
observer as one with knowledge of local history and customs. 8 3
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS AND
CHALLENGES UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY V. CHESTER COUNTY
The Chester County courthouse exterior bears a bronze plaque of the
Ten Commandments. 84 Sally Flynn and the Freethought Society, of which
Flynn is a member, challenged this display of the Ten Commandments
under the Establishment Clause. 8 5 The Third Circuit found the plaque's
display on the courthouse to be within the bounds of the First Amend-
ment.8 6 Although the Third Circuit has not been very active in Establish-
ment Clause cases, its decision in Freethought Society offers a detailed
analysis with which to decide religious display cases.87 The opinion serves
81. See id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to reasonable ob-
server's need for history and context in evaluating whether government conveys
message of endorsing religion).
82. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to how reasonable observer
would generally understand religious display in light of history and context). Jus-
tice O'Connor further refined the endorsement test, incorporating the reasonable
observer standard:
The question under endorsement analysis, in short, is whether a reasona-
ble observer would view such longstanding practices as a disapproval of
his or her particular religious choices, in light of the fact that they serve a
secular purpose rather than a sectarian one and have largely lost their
religious significance over time.
Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's invocation of the endorsement
test's reasonable observer standard in Freethought Society, see infra notes 106-08 and
accompanying text.
84. See Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 250-51 (3d Cir.
2003) (describing location of Ten Commandments plaque).
85. See id. at 250 (identifying plaintiffs).
86. See id. at 271 (holding display constitutional and vacating permanent in-
junction to remove plaque).
87. See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 151
(3d Cir. 2002) (challenging borough's selective enforcement of ordinance under
Free Exercise Clause); ACLU v. Township of Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 266 (3d Cir. 2001)
(challenging township's holiday display; dismissed because plaintiffs did not have
standing to sue); ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1488 (3d
Cir. 1996) (holding policy allowing students to vote on whether to have prayer at
graduation ceremony violated First Amendment; court applied Lemon test). The
Third Circuit has not addressed public display challenges under the Establishment
Clause recently. See generally Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc., 309 F.3d 144 (addressing relig-
ion clause of First Amendment, but not Establishment Clause specifically). While
the issue in Wall concerned a religious display, the Third Circuit did not review the
11
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as a guide to practitioners who wish to bring or defend Establishment
Clause challenges in the Third Circuit. 88
A. The Essential Facts
The facts are essential to Establishment Clause challenges of religious
public displays because the Supreme Court's jurisprudence advances a
case-by-case approach that is necessarily fact-sensitive. 89 Sally Flynn has
been a resident of Chester County in Pennsylvania since 1960 and recently
became a member of the Freethought Society, a forum for atheists, agnos-
tics and freethinkers. 9° Prior to commencing this action, Flynn's attorney
sent a letter to the Chester County Commissioners requesting that the
county remove the plaque.9' Flynn decided to file this action after the
County Commissioners refused to remove the Ten Commandments
plaque from the courthouse facade. 92 Chester County officials denied
Flynn's request, arguing that the circumstances of the plaque's initial ac-
ceptance from the Religious Education Council at the courthouse's dedi-
cation ceremony, as well as the plaque's current status, supported their
decision.9 3
The bronze plaque has a fifty-inch height and thirty-nine inch
width.9 4 It is surrounded by several secular signs of comparable size, such
as a "No Smoking" sign. 95 The new entrance to the courthouse is some
constitutionality of that display because the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. See
Wall, 246 F.3d at 266 (noting lack of standing). Thus, Freethought Society is impor-
tant as a recent pronouncement concerning religious displays in the Third Circuit.
See Freethought Socy, 334 F.3d at 250 (noting subject of challenge). For a detailed
discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Freethought Society, see infra notes
103-20 and accompanying text.
88. For a discussion of the guidelines revealed in Freethought Society, see infra
notes 155-66 and accompanying text.
89. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's case-by-case approach, see supra
notes 56-58, 71-72 and accompanying text.
90. See Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 250 (describing Flynn and Freethought
Society). The court seemed disturbed by the length of Flynn's residence in
Chester County prior to this complaint: "Flynn ... noticed the plaque as early as
1960 but was apparently not bothered enough by it to complain until 2001." Id. at
250. The court also acknowledged, however, that "Flynn has considered herself an
atheist since approximately 1996." See id. at 254 (noting length of Flynn's adher-
ence to atheism).
91. See id. at 255 (recounting Flynn's actions prior to filing suit).
92. See id. (noting that Flynn filed action in Eastern District of Pennsylvania
after county denied her request for removal).
93. See id. at 250-51 (identifying county's focus on history of plaque, its ac-
ceptance from Religious Education Council, and current status of plaque when
county refused request for removal).
94. See id. at 254 (providing dimensions of plaque).
95. See id. (noting other signs placed near Ten Commandments plaque). In
addition to the Ten Commandments plaque, there is: (1) a "No Smoking" sign; (2)
a West Chester Borough Historic Architecture Certification plaque; (3) a listing of
business hours; (4) notification that the courthouse is on the National Register of
Historic Places; and (5) a "No Skateboarding" sign. See id. (listing signs). There
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distance away from the former entrance where the plaque is located, and
the words on the plaque are barely legible to passersby.9 6 The county has
not made any efforts to maintain or highlight the plaque since its accept-
ance.9 7 This exact location and physical description of the plaque pro-
vided the necessary context within which the Court could apply the
appropriate test-the endorsement test-to determine whether the dis-
play violated the Establishment Clause.
98
B. Choosing the Applicable Test
Following a detailed recitation of the facts, the Third Circuit reviewed
the development of Establishment Clause jurisprudence to determine the
appropriate test to apply in this case. 99 First, the court reviewed the Lemon
test and quickly discounted its importance by noting that it has "received
much criticism." 10 0 The court then highlighted the endorsement test as a
clarification of the oft-criticized Lemon test.10 The court elected to follow
the endorsement test and briefly applied the Lemon analysis in the
alternative. 
102
are also other plaques and memorials in the general province of the Ten Com-
mandments. See id. at 254 n.2 (describing other monuments and plaques and their
approximate distances from Ten Commandments plaque).
96. See id. at 253-54 (describing outer facade of courthouse and placement of
plaque in context of surrounding landscape). The plaque was situated as follows:
There are six Corinthian columns in front of the faicade of the Court-
house upon which the plaque is affixed; from certain angles, the columns
obscure the plaque, though the plaque is clearly visible when standing
directly in front of it. The portico in front of the east faclade, where the
Ten Commandments plaque is displayed, spans 64 feet. Only the title,
"The Commandments," is legible to a passerby on the sidewalk in front of
the Courthouse .... To read the text of the Commandments, it is neces-
sary to climb the steps leading to the historic entrance. But since this
entrance was closed in 2001 for security reasons and to cut costs, and the
new entrance is located further north along the sidewalk, there is no rea-
son for a visitor to the Courthouse to climb these steps.
Id.
97. See id. at 250 (recalling county's assertion that it did nothing to maintain
or celebrate plaque); id. at 254 (noting other uses of courthouse, i.e., rallies or
speeches, when one could notice Ten Commandments, but probably does not no-
tice it because nothing is done to highlight or show deference for plaque).
98. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's use of context to apply the endorse-
ment test, see infra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
99. See Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 256-62 (explaining relevant doctrine).
100. See id. at 256 n.4 (referring to Lemon test and citing various instances in
which it has been criticized; collecting criticisms of Lemon).
101. See id. at 256 (describing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch as
clarifying Lemon).
102. See id. at 250 ("[W]e believe that Justice O'Connor's modification of
Lemon, known as the 'endorsement' test, applies in religious display cases of this
type .... [h]owever, in an abundance of caution, we will also analyze the case
under the much maligned Lemon test.").
2004]
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C. Testing the Facts
The court began its analysis by acknowledging the inherent religious-
ness of the Ten Commandments. 10 3 This observation, however, did not
prohibit a finding of constitutionality because "the context of an otherwise
religious display can render the message of the overall display as not en-
dorsing religion."'10 4 With this premise, the court examined the plaque in
light of its historic conveyance and its current context.1 05
1. An Analysis Under the Endorsement Test
The Third Circuit did not frame the endorsement test exactly as
stated by the Supreme Court in Lynch and Allegheny. '0 6 Instead, the court
framed the inquiry as "whether a reasonable observer, aware of the history
of the plaque, would view it as an endorsement of religion by the
County."' 1 0 7 Although the Third Circuit did not phrase the inquiry as a
two-part test, the court applied both prongs of Justice O'Connor's en-
dorsement test.108
As for the purpose prong of the endorsement test, the court found
that Chester County did not intend to endorse religion by refusing to re-
move the plaque in 2001.109 The Third Circuit chose to focus on the
County Commissioners' refusal to remove the plaque upon Flynn's re-
quest in 2001, and not on the circumstances of the plaque's acceptance in
103. See id. at 262 (applying endorsement test). The court noted: "As a prelim-
inary matter, we cannot ignore the inherently religious message of the Ten Com-
mandments." Id. The court cited Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980), to
support this proposition. See id. (noting Stone's holding). Because the inherent
religiousness of the Ten Commandments was contrary to the Third Circuit's hold-
ing in this case, the court distinguished Stone by opining that it is "fairly limited to
its facts." See id. (distinguishing facts of Stone).
104. See id. at 263 (noting that, in Lynch, Supreme Court found religious dis-
play did not endorse religion because of display's history and context).
105. See id. at 251 (describing dedication ceremony where Religious Educa-
tion Council gave plaque to Chester County). For a recitation of the plaque's cur-
rent surroundings, see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
106. For the language of the endorsement test as stated in Lynch, see supra
notes 66-69 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Allegheny decision's
addition of the reasonable observer standard to the endorsement test, see supra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
107. See Freethought Socy, 334 F.3d at 251 (stating inquiry tinder endorsement
test).
108. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's two-part endorsement test, see
supra note 66 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's for-
mulation of the endorsement test, see supra note 107 and infra note 116 and ac-
companying text.
109. See Freethought Soc', 334 F.3d at 266 (noting County Commissioners' in-
tent). The court held: "[v]iewed in this context, the Commissioners' refusal to
remove the plaque appears even less like an endorsement of religion and more
likely motivated by the desire to preserve a plaque that has become part of the
Courthouse." Id. The importance of context is evident here. See id. (same).
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1920, because the refusal was more relevant to the inquiry. 1 10 The court
found that the setting in which the plaque is currently displayed does not
send a message that the government endorses religion, specifically be-
cause the county has done nothing to maintain or highlight the plaque.' I I
As for the effect prong of the endorsement test, the court determined that
a reasonable observer with knowledge of the courthouse's history would
not perceive the plaque as symbolizing government endorsement of relig-
ion.' 12 Moreover, the court found that the main entrance's relocation
away from the entrance near the plaque further decreased the likelihood
that a reasonable observer would perceive the plaque as endorsing
religion.' 13
The age and history of the Ten Commandments plaque were signifi-
cant in the Third Circuit's decision.1 1 4 The Chester County courthouse is
a historic landmark, thus the plaque inherits historical significance from
being conveyed at the courthouse's dedication in 1920.115 The court sum-
marized its application of the endorsement test by noting that the overall
effect of the display did not endorse religion.' 16
110. See id. at 262 (determining that focus on contemporary events would al-
low for consistent application of endorsement test: "[i]t would not make sense for
us to focus on the present day effect of the plaque, and yet only consider the
original purpose for erecting the Ten Commandments plaque").
111. See id. at 266-67 (listing factors that allow reasonable observer to con-
clude that county does not endorse religion).
112. See id. at 265 (offering perspective of reasonable observer). The court
attributed certain assumptions to the reasonable observer in Chester County,
namely that he or she would be informed about the age of the plaque, the general
history of the county and the fact that the county has not maintained or celebrated
the plaque since its acceptance. See id. at 260, 267 (identifying characteristics of
reasonable observer). Thus, "[t]he reasonable observer, knowing the age of the
Ten Commandments plaque, would regard the decision to leave it in place as mo-
tivated, in significant part, by the desire to preserve a longstanding plaque." Id. at
265.
113. See id. at 266 (noting that old entrance to courthouse is closed, which
detracts "from the obviousness and accessibility of the plaque," further minimizing
its religious message).
114. See id. at 263-67 (applying endorsement test to facts, constantly referring
to history of plaque and context of display).
115. See id. at 266 (noting importance of fact that courthouse has been placed
on National Register of Historic Places); id. at 249 (noting that county received
plaque at dedication ceremony in 1920).
116. See id. at 251 (listing court's conclusions under endorsement test). The
court summarized:
Applying the "endorsement" test, we conclude that: (1) the reasonable
observer would be aware of the approximate age of the plaque and the
fact that the County has done nothing since it was erected to highlight or
celebrate the plaque; (2) because of the plaque's age and its placement
on an historic Courthouse, the reasonable observer would believe that
the plaque itself is historic; and (3) the reasonable observer would not
believe that the County's inaction was motivated by a desire to endorse
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2. A Brief Reference to the Lemon Test
The Third Circuit briefly analyzed the case under the Lemon test.' 17
Extracting the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test, which are the
key components of the endorsement test, the court held that the plaque's
display of the Ten Commandments passed constitutional muster.1 18 The
court found that the County Commissioners' refusal to remove the plaque
for historical reasons was a legitimate secular purpose that satisfied "the
relatively low threshold required by the purpose prong of Lemon."1 19 To
show that the plaque satisfied the effect prong of the Lemon test, the court
incorporated its analysis under the endorsement test (which it equated
with the effect prong) and ended its discussion. 120
IV. ANALYSIS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S OPINION IN
FREETHOUGHT SOCIETY AND THE INFREQUENCY OF
CERTIORARI FROM THE SUPREME COURT
The Third Circuit's opinion in Freethought Society is important to the
current legal landscape because of recent attempts to display the Ten
Commandments-dubbed the "Hang-Ten" movement. 12 1 "Hang-Ten"
proponents argue that recent rashes of school violence and the war on
terrorism warrant displaying the Ten Commandments to remind Ameri-
cans that laws are based on a moral code. 12 2 Although the Supreme Court
already addressed this issue in Stone v. Graham, which invalidated a statute
that required posting the Ten Commandments in public school class-
rooms, 123 the Court's later jurisprudence has created a window of oppor-
117. See id. at 267 (entitling section "The Lemon Test (Purpose and Effect)").
The court appears to apply the Lemon analysis out of caution, rather than because
of the test's importance as legal precedent. See id. at 250 (describing Lemon analy-
sis as cautionary measure).
118. See id. at 269 (holding that "Commissioners' refusal to remove the
plaque passes constitutional muster under both the purpose and effect prongs of
Lemon").
119. See id. at 267 (referring to low threshold requirement and finding that
Commissioners offered legitimate reasons for refusing to remove plaque). The
court recounted some of the Commissioners' statements at the trial that led to this
conclusion. See id. (recounting testimony).
120. See id. at 269 (incorporating endorsement discussion because "effect
under the Lemon test is cognate to endorsement").
121. See generally Abdel-Monem, supra note 45, at 1024 (describing "Hang
Ten" movements and offering predictions of how Supreme Court jurisprudence
may address these movements).
122. See id. at 1043 (noting that "Hang-Ten" began after school shootings
rocked national audiences and local communities where those shootings oc-
curred). For further discussion of school violence and the September 11, 2001
attacks as the impetus for religious revival, see infra notes 128-32 and accompany-
ing text.
123. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Stone v. Graham, see
supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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tunity for proponents of "Hang-Ten." 124  Moreover, the Court's
adherence to a strict case-by-case analysis of religious displays under the
preferred endorsement test makes it unlikely that the Court will grant cer-
tiorari to many cases in the possible surge of religious display challenges
that may develop out of "Hang-Ten." 125 Although the Court has granted
certiorari to two of these recent cases, the Court is not likely to create a
new test;126 this leaves the circuits to adjudicate these issues in their re-
spective jurisdictions under the prevailing endorsement test, which allows
for the possibility of inconsistent holdings in light of its fact-specific
inquiry. 1
2 7
A. The "Hang-Ten" Movement
The Third Circuit's opinion in Freethought Society is important in light
of the "Hang-Ten" movement, which advocates posting the Ten Com-
mandments in public schools and government buildings. 128 Proponents
of "Hang-Ten" argue that violent outbreaks in schools militate displaying
the Ten Commandments to ignite a return to morality.' 29 Support for
"Hang-Ten" is strongest at the local level, with grassroots campaigns en-
couraging local school districts to post the Ten Commandments.' 30 State
124. See, e.g., Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 614 (1989) (focusing on effect
of overall setting to uphold city's display of menorah). Arguably, the overall set-
ting of a Ten Commandments display could secularize its religious message. See,
e.g., Bell, supra note 2, at 1274-75 (explaining concept of secularization, where
Supreme Court has justified certain religious expressions because of their context
or tradition).
125. But see ACLU v. McCreary, No. 03-1693, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6693, at *1
(Oct. 12, 2004) (granting certiorari to Sixth Circuit opinion involving Ten Com-
mandments display); Van Orden v. Perry, No. 03-1500, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6691, at
*1 (Oct. 12, 2004) (same for Fifth Circuit case). For a discussion of the Court's
preference for a case-by-case analysis under the endorsement test in religious dis-
play cases, see supra notes 56-58, 71-72 and accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of the Court's decision to grant certiorari in two Ten
Commandments display cases, see infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion of the fact-specific inquiries used in religious display
cases, see supra notes 56-61, 71-72 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Abdel-Monem, supra note 45, at 1024 (defining "Hang-Ten"
movement); J.R. Labbe, The Undercurrent of the Hang Ten Campaign, FORT WORTH
STAR TELEGRAM, Jan. 23, 2003, at 4 (attributing "Hang-Ten" campaign to efforts of
Family Research Council, "[a] pro-family-faith-and-freedom group").
129. See, e.g., Abdel-Monem, supra note 45, at 1034 (listing proponents' argu-
ments); Derek H. Davis, The Ten Commandments As Public Ritual, 44J. OF CHURCH &
STATE 221, 221 (2002) (noting that Columbine and other school shootings led to
national "outcry ... for a return to religious values").
130. See, e.g., Abdel-Monem, supra note 45, at 1044-45 (observing popular
support for "Hang-Ten" at local level and identifying grassroots efforts to prompt
legislative action in favor of issue); Brian Lewis, 200 Turn Out to Support Courthouse
Display, THE TENNESSEAN, Oct. 18, 2002, at IB (reporting outpour of citizen sup-
port after County Commissioners voted to place Ten Commandments in court-
house as part of larger historical display); State Officials Handed Commandments,
BucYRus TELEGRAPH FORUM, Oct. 15, 2003, at 2A (reporting Christian Coalition's
program of giving framed copies of Ten Commandments to local legislators to
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legislatures, prompted by conservative politicians and strong religious lob-
bies, have debated the issue and some have passed legislation to permit
posting the Ten Commandments. 31 With a growing public sentiment for
moral revival-especially in the wake of the Columbine High School
shootings, the September 11, 2001 attacks and the war on terrorism-leg-
islatures and courts are likely to confront the issue of public religious dis-
plays. 132 The Third Circuit, after its opinion in Freethought Society, now has
hang in their offices; noting that Alabama case Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282
(11th Cir. 2003), sparked this program).
131. See, e.g., Abdel-Monem, supra note 45, at 1043-44 (describing supporters
of "Hang-Ten" as "individual citizens acting alone or with others, well-organized
religious lobbying groups, and politicians"); see id. at 1046 (noting that some states
have passed legislation in support of "Hang-Ten"); id. at 1044-45 n.178-83 (col-
lecting articles recounting local displays of support for religious postings). These
legislatures have tailored their respective statutes to comport with Supreme Court
doctrine-namely that the overall display cannot endorse religion-by requiring
that the display include other non-religious historical references. See, e.g., id. at
1046 (noting that enacted legislation requires posting along with other non-relig-
ious documents); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (determin-
ing that exclusively focusing on religious nature of display or activity would violate
Establishment Clause); Davis, supra note 129, at 226 (noting phenomenon of
"creche strategy," named after creche in Lynch, where local governments are cir-
cumventingjudicial opinions by posting Ten Commandments with other historical
documents in order to "secularize" government religious displays). Indiana, Ken-
tucky and South Dakota have enacted such legislation. See, e.g., Abdel-Monem,
supra note 45, at 1046 (naming states). For example, South Dakota's statute allows
the government to display the Ten Commandments:
An object or document containing the words of the Ten Commandments
may be displayed in any public school classroom, public school building,
or at any public school event, along with other objects and documents of
cultural legal, or historical significance that have formed and influenced
the legal and governmental systems of the United States and the State of
South Dakota. Such display of an object or document containing the
words of the Ten Commandments: (1) Shall be in the same manner and
appearance generally as other objects and documents displayed; and (2)
May not be presented or displayed in any fashion that results in calling
attention to it apart from the other displayed objects and documents.
Id. at 1046 n.191 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-24-17.1 (Michie 2000)).
132. See, e.g., Larry Copeland, Church-and-State Standoffs Spread over USA, USA
TODAY, Sept. 30, 2003, at 15A (noting proliferation of disputes over Ten Com-
mandments displays beginning in 2000). Although initially fueled by incidents of
school violence, support for Ten Commandments displays has also risen in re-
sponse to the September 11, 2001 attacks and President Bush's war on terrorism.
See, e.g., Glynn Wilson, Monumental Clash over Ten Commandments, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 25, 2002, at 3 (noting influence of September 11, 2001 attacks and
President Bush's impact as "one of the nation's most openly religious presidents");
see alsoJoseph L. Conn, The Christian Coalition: Born Again? With Help from a New TV
Preacher and a Dose of Old-Time Religion, Roberta Combs Hopes to Resurrect the Christian
Coalition, 55J. OF CHURCH & ST. 12, 12-13 (2003) (noting resurgence of Christian
Coalition after September 11, 2001 attacks); Davis, supra note 129, at 221 (describ-
ing September 11, 2001 attacks as creating "a 'return to God"' and noting ensuing
popular support for Ten Commandments displays); Ina Hughs, "Thou Shalt Not
. .. "; Issue of Posting Ten Commandments in Public Places is Much More than Theological,
Judicial Controversy, KNOXVqLLE NEW-SENTINEL, June 2, 2002, at HI (describing Ten
924
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guidelines with which to handle this potential onslaught of Ten Com-
mandments cases1 3
3
B. How Often Will the Supreme Court Weigh in on the Issue?
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to only two of the recent
religious public display cases, despite the inconsistencies among the cir-
cuits. 134 In 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a Fifth Circuit
opinion upholding a Ten Commandments display and a Sixth Circuit
opinion affirming an injunction to remove three separate Ten Command-
ments displays. 13 5 The Court's willingness to hear these two cases came as
a surprise.136 Although the Court will hear argument on these cases and
decide the constitutionality of the displays, the Court is likely to continue
to apply the endorsement test.137
Commandments plaque hung in local courthouse for six-month anniversary of
September 11, 2001 attacks).
133. For a discussion of the guidelines set forth in Freethought Society, see infra
notes 155-66 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Supreme Court Decides It Shall Not, Justices Decline to Hear Case on
Ten Commandments, WINSTON-SALEM J., Feb. 26, 2002, at Al (noting Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Seventh Circuit case that refused to grant state per-
mission to construct Ten Commandments monument for state capitol). Although
courts have reached "different conclusions" on the issue, "[o]nly the Supreme
Court can resolve the question, and it chose . . . to steer clear for now." See id.
(noting denial of certiorari despite inconsistencies).
135. See ACLU v. McCreary, No. 03-1693, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6693, at *1 (Oct.
12, 2004) (granting certiorari); Van Orden v. Perry, No. 03-1500, 2004 U.S. LEXIS
6691, at *1 (Oct. 12, 2004) (same). The issue in McCreary concerned three sepa-
rate displays of the Ten Commandments, two in separate county courthouses and
one in a public school. See ACLU v. McCreary, 354 F.3d 438, 441-42 (6th Cir.
2003) (describing displays), cert. granted, No. 03-1693, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6693, at *1
(Oct. 12, 2004). The Sixth Circuit held that the displays violated the Establish-
ment Clause. See id. at 460-62 (noting holding). The display in Van Orden was a
monument of the Ten Commandments located on state capitol grounds among
several other displays. See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 176-77 (5th Cir.
2003) (describing display), cert. granted, No. 03-1500, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6691, at *1
(Oct. 12, 2004). The Fifth Circuit found the monument did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. See id. at 182 (noting holding).
136. See Gibson, supra note 8 (noting that "the court signaled it would pass on
the issue" by denying certiorari to case involving Alabama Supreme Court Justice
Roy Moore's refusal to remove Ten Commandments monument from courthouse
rotunda); THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ONLINE, at http://www.usconstitution.net/
constcur.html ("In a surprise move, the justices decided to step into a fray, to rule
on the constitutionality of displays of the Ten Commandments on public prop-
erty.") (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
137. See, e.g., Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, No. 02-1626, 2004 U.S. LEXIS
4178, at *53-54 (June 14, 2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (insisting that en-
dorsement test is prevailing test for Establishment Clause challenges). The Court's
opinion in Newdow further supports the infrequency with which the Court will hear
cases involving the religion clauses of the First Amendment, for the Court dodged
a constitutional holding and relied on the plaintiff's lack of standing. See id. at *27
(noting lack of standing).
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Also in 2004, however, the Court denied certiorari to the highly con-
troversial Eleventh Circuit case ordering an Alabama Supreme Court Jus-
tice to remove a Ten Commandments monument from the state
courthouse.' 38 In 2002, the Supreme Court quietly denied certiorari to an
Establishment Clause challenge to a Ten Commandments monument
planned for display in a state park in Indiana Civil Liberties Union v.
O'Bannon.'39 Moreover, in 2001, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to
an Establishment Clause challenge of a Ten Commandments monument
in Books v. City of Elkhart. 14° In denying the city's petition for certiorari
after the Seventh Circuit ruled for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court noted
the specific factual circumstances of the monument's dedication and phys-
ical display that made it unconstitutional.141 Only three Justices opposed
the denial of certiorari, 142 which bolsters the contention that the current
court will not frequently grant certiorari to similar cases.' 43 For now, Stone
v. Graham remains the Supreme Court's only word on the issue, and will
remain so unless the Court overrules it in this coming term. 14 4 As long as
the endorsement test remains the prevailing method of analysis for relig-
ious display cases, the circuit courts will be left to sort through the facts of
each particular religious display and determine whether the display consti-
tutes an endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. ' 4
5
138. See Glassroth v. Moore, No. 03-468, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 7973, at *1 (Nov. 3,
2004) (denying certiorari).
139. 259 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming preliminary injunction to
prevent constructing monument pending resolution of constitutionality issue, but
declaring that result should be same), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1162 (2002).
140. 235 F.3d 292, 307 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Ten Commandments
monument on government property endorsed religion), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1058
(2001).
141. See City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1059 (2001) (noting key fac-
tors leading to denial of certiorari such as enlarged title "Ten Commandments"
and participation of priest, minister and rabbi in dedication ceremony).
142. See id. at 1059 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (joining ChiefJustice Rehnquist
in his dissent were Justices Scalia and Thomas).
143. See, e.g., FoxNEwS.COM, High Court to Decide Ten Commandments Issue (Oct.
12, 2004), at http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly-story/0,3566,135165,00.
html (noting "justices have repeatedly refused to get involved in Ten Command-
ments disputes," with "only three conservative justices complain [ing]" about that
refusal).
144. See, e.g., Gregory M. Bartlett, Displaying the Ten Commandments on Public
Property: The Kentucky Experience: Wasn't It Written in Stone ?, 30 N. Ky. L. Rv. 163,
187 (2003) (declaring that Stone remains controlling precedent in cases involving
public displays of Ten Commandments). The Court is set to decide the two Ten
Commandments display cases in June, 2005. See Gibson, supra note 8, at 1A (not-
ing that Court will hear arguments in February, 2005 and issue opinion in June,
2005).
145. For a discussion of the endorsement test as the preferred analysis for
public religious displays, see supra notes 49-82 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 49: p. 907926
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C. Other Circuits' Recent Confrontations with Religious Display Cases
Other circuit courts have addressed recent challenges to religious dis-
plays. 14 6 For example, in November 2003, the Fifth Circuit declared that a
forty-two-year-old monument of the Ten Commandments on the grounds
of a state capitol building did not amount to government endorsement of
religion. 14 7 The Fifth Circuit cited Freethought Society to highlight the mon-
ument's historical importance; the Supreme Court has recently granted
certiorari to decide this issue. 148 In that same year, the Sixth Circuit
reached a different conclusion, finding Ten Commandments displays in
two county courthouses and one public school building unconstitutional;
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to this case as well. 149 The Eighth
Circuit, in a 2004 opinion that distinguished Freethought Society, held a Ten
Commandments monument in a public park unconstitutional because the
government actively maintained the monument and it had no historical
146. See, e.g., ACLU v. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1042 (8th Cir. 2004) (find-
ing that Ten Commandments monument displayed in public park failed purpose
and effect prongs of Lemon; citing and distinguishing Freethought Society); Baker v.
Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., No. 02-3776, 02-3777, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
481, at *15 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2004) (holding stone monuments of Ten Command-
ments erected at four new high schools violated Establishment Clause because
school board did not offer secular justification for displaying Ten Command-
ments); ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 453-54 (6th Cir. 2003) (af-
firming injunction for removal of three separate displays of Ten Commandments,
two in courthouse and one in public school), cert. granted, No. 03-1693, 2004 U.S.
LEXIS 6693, at *1 (Oct. 12, 2004); Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir.
2003) (finding display of Moses with Ten Commandments did not violate Estab-
lishment Clause because of age, history and overall context of display), cert. granted,
No. 03-1500, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6691, at *1 (Oct. 12, 2004); Glassroth v. Moore, 335
F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that placement of Ten Commandments
monument in rotunda of courthouse violated purpose prong of Lemon, rendering
it unconstitutional; citing and distinguishing Freethought Society), cert. denied, No. 03-
468, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 7973, at *1 (Nov. 3, 2004); King v. Richmond County, 331
F.3d 1271, 1286 (l1th Cir. 2003) (affirming conclusion that county seal with Ten
Commandments imagery used to authenticate legal documents did not violate Es-
tablishment Clause because it lacked purpose or effect of endorsing religion);
O'Bannon v. Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2001) (af-
firming preliminary injunction to prevent constructing monument), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1162 (2002); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 281 (4th Cir. 2001) (declar-
ing that moment of silence did not amount to Establishment Clause violation);
City of Elkhart v. Books, 235 F.3d 292, 307 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Ten Com-
mandments monument on government property failed purpose and effect prongs
of Lemon analysis), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001).
147. See Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 182 (finding that display of Moses with Ten
Commandments did not violate Establishment Clause).
148. See id. at 181-82 (noting that "history. matters here" and that history sup-
ports finding of secular purpose; citing Freethought Society). For a discussion of the
Court's decision to grant certiorari, see supra notes 134-37 and accompanying
text.
149. See McCreary, 354 F.3d at 441-42 (describing displays). For a discussion
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significance. 150 Finally, in the most controversial of these recent deci-
sions, the Eleventh Circuit rendered diverging opinions in two Establish-
ment Clause cases. 15 1 In May of 2003, the court upheld the use of a state
seal containing Roman numerals I-X meant to symbolize the Ten Com-
mandments. 15 2 In late 2003, however, the Eleventh Circuit declared a
two-and-one-half-ton monument of the Ten Commandments in a court-
house rotunda unconstitutional and distinguished Freethought Society in its
holding. 153 Although the circuits have rendered inconsistent opinions, all
150. See Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1042 (finding Ten Commandments monu-
ment unconstitutional). The Eighth Circuit focused on a few key factors, namely
that the city did not have a secular purpose in accepting and erecting the plaque,
the city maintained the plaque and the surroundings did not secularize the relig-
ious message of the Ten Commandments. See id. at 1035-41 (identifying factors).
The Eighth Circuit used these factors to distinguish Freethought Society by noting
that the City of Plattsmouth, unlike Chester County, actively maintained the monu-
ment. See id. at 1039 (noting maintenance). Moreover, the Plattsmouth monu-
ment was relatively new, thirty-five years old, and stood alone in the park with
nothing to detract from its religiousness. See id. at 1039-40 (recounting age and
location).
151. See, e.g., Stan Bailey, Commandments Plaque Put on Display by Riley, BipMIN,-
HAM NEWS, Sept. 10, 2003, at IA. (noting controversy of Alabama Supreme Court
ChiefJustice Moore being ordered to remove Ten Commandments monument he
erected in courthouse and Alabama Governor Riley's subsequent decision to in-
clude Ten Commandments in larger display in Supreme Court Library of State
Capitol); Tracy Connor, Monumental Battle in Ala., DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug.
22, 2003, at 28 (noting Ten Commandments controversy in Alabama).
152. See King, 331 F.3d at 1286 (finding county seal constitutional). The court
focused on four factors to reach this holding: (1) the use of the seal is limited to
authentication of legal documents; (2) the seal contains a sword in addition to the
tablet inscribed with Roman numerals I-X; (3) the seal is relatively small and is
usually placed at the bottom or final page of the document; and (4) the actual text
of the Ten Commandments is not displayed on the seal. See id. at 1283-86
(describing four factors). These factors made it unlikely that a reasonable ob-
server would view the seal as a government endorsement of religion. See id. at 1286
(noting reasonable observer's perspective). Moreover, the seal has been used for
at least 130 years. See id. (noting duration of use).
153. See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding
monument in rotunda of courthouse unconstitutional), cert. denied, No. 03-468,
2003 U.S. LEXIS 7973, at *1 (Nov. 3, 2004). This case is notable for its shock value
because the ChiefJustice of the Alabama Supreme Court erected the monument
with his own funds after being elected on a platform "to restore the moral founda-
tion of law." See id. at 1285 (describing election platform and noting that erection
of monument fulfilled campaign promise). In fact, ChiefJustice Moore was known
as the "Ten Commandments Judge" throughout his campaign. See id. (noting
nickname). The plaintiffs were three practicing attorneys forced to face the monu-
ment every time they entered the courthouse. See id. at 1288 (identifying plain-
tiffs). The Eleventh Circuit distinguished its holding in Glassroth from the Third
Circuit's opinion in Freethought Society. See id. at 1299-1300 (distinguishing cases).
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the brand-new monument that ChiefJustice
Moore constructed had no historical significance, unlike the plaque in Freethought
Society. See id. (noting monument's lack of historical importance). Moreover,
Chief Justice Moore specially designed the monument for display in the court-
house rotunda, whereas Chester County did not maintain the plaque. See id. (not-
ing that Alabama Chief Justice highlighted monument).
928 [Vol. 49: p. 907
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have applied the law consistently to evaluate each specific display within its




The decision in Freethought Society instructs practitioners litigating Es-
tablishment Clause issues in the Third Circuit that certain key factors may
be necessary to a successful litigation strategy.1 5 5 For example, the court
focused on the history and overall context in which the government dis-
played the religious symbol. 156 The court assumed the reasonable ob-
server had the requisite knowledge of that history and context.' 57 Hence,
a plaque with a long history is more likely to survive scrutiny.' 58 Moreo-
ver, although the inclusion of other secular symbols within the religious
display diluted the religiosity of the plaque in Freethought Society, such inclu-
sion will not necessarily remove the purpose or effect of government en-
dorsement in all instances.1 59
Litigators should focus on the aforementioned factors, being as fact-
specific as possible in presenting their cases.1 60 The endorsement test ap-
pears to be the Third Circuit's preferred analysis and should constitute the
primary argument for religious display cases brought under that court's
154. For a discussion of the circuit courts' opinions and their reliance on his-
tory and context, see supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of important litigation factors, see infra notes 156-66
and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's focus on history and context in
Freethought Society, see supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
157. For the Third Circuit's description of the reasonable observer in
Freethought Society, see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reliance on the plaque's age in
Freethought Society, see supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
159. For a discussion of the impact of the surrounding plaques, see supra
notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of the fact-specific inquiry in Freethought Society, see supra
notes 103-20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the importance of fac-
tual inquiries in the case-by-case approach required to apply the endorsement test
to Establishment Clause challenges in general, see supra notes 62-72 and accompa-
nying text. Litigators should also focus on the threshold issue of standing, which is
important in Establishment Clause challenges of public displays because the plain-
tiffs' injuries are usually non-economic. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Ass'n v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982) (stating
that plaintiffs must show some injury other than "the psychological consequence
presumably produced by the observation of conduct with which one disagrees").
There are, however, instances where plaintiffs challenging public religious displays
suffer economic injuries. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th
Cir. 2003) (noting that plaintiff attorneys altered their behavior to avoid con-
fronting Ten Commandments monument in courthouse's rotunda; for example,
they paid to have documents delivered to courthouse by messenger, which consti-
tuted economic injury), cert. denied, No. 03-468, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 7973, at *1 (Nov.
3, 2004).
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jurisdiction. 16 1 The Lemon test should also be argued in the alternative,
however, bearing in mind the court's use of the endorsement test is the
equivalent of Lemon's second prong. 16 2
Those challenging religious displays should look to the 2004 Eighth
Circuit and 2003 Eleventh Circuit opinions, which distinguished
Freethought Society and found that two Ten Commandments displays vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. 163 These circuits seized on the facts that
each display's overall effect did not overshadow the religiosity of the Ten
Commandments and that the display's historical importance was minimal,
if it existed at all. 1 64 Those defending against Establishment Clause chal-
lenges should focus on the display's history and overall secular context, as
did the defendant county in Freethought Society, arguing that context has
secularized the religious object over time. 165 Whatever one's personal
stance is on the issue of government religious displays, the recent "Hang-
Ten" movement is sure to fill the circuit courts' dockets with Establish-
ment Clause cases, and the buck is likely to stop with the Third Circuit's
decision in Freethought Society, providing the final word in that circuit until




161. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's preference for the endorsement
test in- religious display cases and as the primary analysis in Freethought Society, see
supra notes 99-102, 106-16 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the Lemon test as a
cautionary measure, see supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
163. See ACLU v. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1042 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding
that monument of Ten Commandments located in public park violated Establish-
ment Clause); Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1297 (finding that monument of Ten Com-
mandments violated Establishment Clause). For the Eighth Circuit's arguments
distinguishing Freethought Society, see supra note 150 and accompanying text. For
the Eleventh Circuit's arguments distinguishing Freethought Society, see supra notes
151-52 and accompanying text.
164. See Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1036 (declaring "[n]othing in the monu-
ment's [surroundings] suggests its religious message might not be its raison
d'etre"); id. at 1039 (highlighting that thirty-five-year-old monument is no histori-
cal artifact); Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1297 (affirming district court's conclusion that
monument creates '[an] overwhelmingly holy aura" in courthouse rotunda).
165. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reliance on history and context in
Freethought Society, see supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the possible flood of litigation from the "Hang-Ten"
movement, see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. For a discussion that
the circuit courts may be the final arbiters of religious public display cases because
the Supreme Court may not frequently grant certiorari to religious display cases,
nor create a new test, see supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
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